Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content

In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of the brain’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone unnoticed that connectionism adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new focus – one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the mind. Indeed, if Horgan and Tienson’s dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance theory of mental content

The Mind: Embodied, Embedded, but not Extended

This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways

A Defence of Cartesian Materialism

One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in "Consciousness Explained" is to demolish the Cartesian theatre model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or the philosophy of mind. Our response is quite different. We believe that, once properly formulated, Cartesian materialism is no straw man. Rather, it is an attractive hypothesis about the relationship between the computational architecture of the brain and phenomenal consciousness, and hence one that is worthy of further exploration. Consequently, our primary aim in this paper is to defend Cartesian materialism from Dennett's assault. We do this by showing that Dennett's argument against this position is founded on an implicit assumption (about the relationship between phenomenal experience and information coding in the brain), which while valid in the context of classical cognitive science, is not forced on connectionism

Cassava consumption and the occurrence of cyanide in cassava in Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines

AbstractObjective:To make a tentative assessment of the consumption of cassava in three countries in South-east Asia and the cyanogenic potential (CNp) of the crop as a possible food safety issue.Design:We used data from the Ministry of Health in Vietnam and Statistics Authorities in Indonesia and Philippines (mean household consumption per province) to assess cassava consumption. Conversions of units were needed to facilitate the comparison of cassava consumption between countries. The most up-to-date data available regarding both cassava consumption and the CNp of cassava grown in the respective countries were assessed.Settings:Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines.Participants:Respondents from provinces in Vietnam (nineteen), Indonesia (thirty-three) and Philippines (eighty-one) were asked to complete a recall questionnaire detailing either the previous 24-h' or the 7-d' cassava consumption.Results:Among the three countries, available data indicated that the highest median cassava-consumption figurespercapitawere from Indonesia and the Philippines (9·01 and 7·28 g/capita per d, respectively), with Vietnam having the least (1·14 g/capita per d). Published information regarding the CNp of cassava in the three countries was limited.Conclusions:While the findings of the present study are somewhat limited by a lack of available information regarding both the extent of cassava consumption and the CNp of cassava consumed in the three countries, it appears likely that cyanogen intake arising from cassava consumption among the three countries exceeds the FAO/WHO Provisional Maximum Tolerable Daily Intake, although any risk to public health appears limited to a minority of provinces in each country

A theological analysis of post-conciliar Roman Catholic catechetics as an aspect of the ministry of the divine word

The norms and criteria for the authentic transmission of the Gospel message in catechesis as postulated in the General Director for Catechesis (1997) are identified, after which they are used to assess some existing theoretical catechetical material that has informed the practice of post-conciliar Roman Catholic catechetics. Next catechetics - and the above norms and criteria - are shown to discover their ground in relation to the divine Revelation of the person of Jesus Christ and the response of faith. By utilising the scheme of fundamental theology derived from the contribution of Balthasar as presented in his Trilogy the relationship between the divine Revelation of Jesus Christ and the faith response and the norms and criteria necessary for the transmission of the Gospel message in catechesis is further explicated. This allows the presentation of a post-conciliar catechetics as grounded in the derived scheme of fundamental theology from Balthasar's contribution. The scheme of fundamental theology derived from Balthasar is then married with Lonergan's contribution on transcendental method and Dulles' work on systems of revelation in order to present a way to deepen the understanding of the whole structure of knowledge of the faith made in response to the divine Revelation of the person of Jesus Christ. This takes the form of a detailed theoretical template that identifies and addresses the elements intrinsic to, and constitutive of the relationship between the divine Revelation of the person of Jesus Christ and the faith response, and the norms and criteria that govern the authentic transmission of the Gospel message in catechesis as consistent with the workings and autonomy of the human mind. Finally, the detailed theoretical template is applied to the practice of post-conciliar catechetics, and used to critique more precisely those theoretical catechetical materials formerly investigated at the initial stages of the thesis

The Disunity of Consciousness

It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue that the orthodox view is quite wrong: phenomenal experience is not a unity, in the sense of being a single thing at each instant. It is a multiplicity, an aggregate of phenomenal elements, each of which is the product of a distinct consciousness-making mechanism in the brain. Consequently, cognitive science is in need of a multi-track theory of consciousness; a computational model that acknowledges both the manifold nature of experience, and its distributed neural basis